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SARS-CoV-2 elimination, not mitigation, creates best outcomes for health, the economy, 
and civil liberties  
The trade-off between different objectives is at the heart of political decision making. Public 
health, economic growth, democratic solidarity, and civil liberties are important factors when 
evaluating pandemic responses. There is mounting evidence that these objectives do not need 
to be in conflict in the COVID-19 response. Countries that consistently aim for elimination—ie, 
maximum action to control SARS-CoV-2 and stop community transmission as quickly as 
possible—have generally fared better than countries that opt for mitigation—ie, action 
increased in a stepwise, targeted way to reduce cases so as not to overwhelm health-care 
systems.1 
We compared COVID-19 deaths, gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and strictness of 
lockdown measures during the first 12 months of the pandemic for Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that aim for elimination or mitigation 
(figure).2–4 Although all indicators favour elimination, our analysis does not prove a causal 
connection between varying pandemic response strategies and the different outcome 
measures. COVID-19 deaths per 1 million population in OECD countries that opted for 
elimination (Australia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) have been about 25 
times lower than in other OECD countries that favoured mitigation (figure). Mortality is a proxy 
for a country’s broader disease burden. For example, decision makers should also consider the 
increasing evidence of long-term morbidities after SARS-CoV-2 infection.5 
There is also increasing consensus that elimination is preferable to mitigation in relation to a 
country’s eco-nomic performance.6 One study quantified the optimal basic reproduction 
number so that elimination is achieved at minimal economic cost.7 To this end, consider weekly 
GDP growth with respect to 2019 for the OECD countries that opted for elimination or mitigation 
(figure). Elimination is superior to mitigation for GDP growth on average and at almost all time 
periods. GDP growth returned to pre-pandemic levels in early 2021 in the five countries that 
opted for elimination, whereas growth is still negative for the other 32 OECD countries. 
Despite its health and economic advantages, an elimination strategy has been criticised for 
restricting civil liberties. This claim can be challenged by analysing the stringency index 
developed by researchers at the University of Oxford.2 This index measures the strictness of 
lockdown-style policies that primarily restrict people’s behaviour by combining eight indicators 
of containment and closure policies, eight indicators of health system policies, and one 
indicator of public information campaigns.2 Among OECD countries, liberties were most 
severely impacted in those that chose mitigation, whereas swift lockdown measures—in line 
with elimination—were less strict and of shorter duration (figure). Importantly, elimination has 
been framed as a civic solidarity approach that will restore civil liberties the soonest; this focus 
on common purpose is frequently neglected in the political debate. 
 
 
Figure: COVID-19 deaths, GDP growth, and strictness of lockdown measures for OECD countries choosing 
SARS-CoV-2 elimination versus mitigation 
OECD countries opting for elimination are Australia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. OECD 
countries opting for mitigation are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the UK, and the USA. Data on strictness of lockdown measures are from Oxford COVID-19 government 
response tracker.2 Data on COVID-19 deaths are from Our World in Data.3 Data on GDP growth are from OECD 
Weekly Tracker of economic activity.4 GDP=gross domestic product. OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
 
Evidence suggests that countries that opt for rapid action to eliminate SARS-CoV-2—with the 
strong support of their inhabitants—also better protect their economies and minimise 
restrictions on civil liberties compared with those that strive for mitigation. Looking ahead, 
mass COVID-19 vaccination is key to returning to usual life, but relying solely on COVID-19 
vaccines to control the pandemic is risky due to their uneven roll-out and uptake, time-limited 
immunity, and the emergence of new SARS-CoV-2 variants.8,9 History shows that vaccination 
alone can neither single-handedly nor rapidly control a virus and that a combination of public 
health measures are needed for containment. The eradication of small-pox required 
concerted, decades-long efforts, including vaccination; communication and public 
engagement; and test, trace, and isolate measures.10 Even at the end of vaccination 
campaigns, such public health measures must be maintained to some extent or new waves of 
infections might lead to increased morbidity and mortality.11 With the proliferation of new 
SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, many scientists are calling for a coordinated international 
strategy to eliminate SARS-CoV-2.12–15 Moreover, the US Department of State declared in April, 
2021, that stopping COVID-19 is the Biden–Harris administration’s number one priority and 
highlighted that “this pandemic won’t end at home until it ends worldwide”.16 
National action alone is insufficient and a clear global plan to exit the pandemic is necessary. 
Countries that opt to live with the virus will likely pose a threat to other countries, notably those 
that have less access to COVID-19 vaccines. The uncertainty of lockdown timing, duration, and 
severity will stifle economic growth as businesses withhold investments and consumer 
confidence deteriorates. Global trade and travel will continue to be affected. Political 
indecisiveness and partisan policy decisions reduce trust in government. This does not bode 
well in those countries that have seen a retraction of democracy.17 Meanwhile, countries opting 
for elimination are likely to return to near normal: they can restart their economies, allow travel 
between green zones,18 and support other countries in their vaccination campaigns and 
beyond. The consequences of varying government COVID-19 responses will be long-lasting and 
extend beyond the end of the pandemic. Early economic and political gains made by countries 
aiming to eliminate SARS-CoV-2 will probably pay off in the long run. 
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